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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A list of the atrocities committed by the various parties 
to the Syrian conflict, now entering its ninth year, resembles 
an encyclopedia of international crimes and human rights 
violations: deliberate and indiscriminate attacks on civilians, 
arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture, use of 
child soldiers, extrajudicial executions, sexual violence, use of 
prohibited weapons, and resort to starvation as a tool of 
warfare.2 The staggering number of offences is reflected in the 
sheer volume of information about the conflict, including in 
the form of images, videos, interviews, reports, and other 
types of documentation.  
The Syrian conflict exemplifies the new reality of 
investigations into the commission of atrocity crimes, one 
where many diverse parties act as “suppliers”, collecting, 
preserving, and distributing information on these offences. 
With the ever-growing dissemination of technology and 
importance of the Internet, this trend is likely to continue in 
future conflicts.  
The increase in the number of suppliers has presented 
new and significant challenges for those seeking justice for 
international crimes and gross human rights abuses. 
Duplication of efforts results in the inefficient use of resources 
and the endangerment of witnesses. Prosecutors and other 
“demanders” of information must waste time navigating a 
                                                 
 
 
2 See Syria, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/middle-
east/n-africa/syria (last visited Apr 2, 2018); Justice for Syria, AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL (2017),____________________________________________ 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2017/03/justice-for-
syria/ (Apr 2, 2018); SARAH CHYNOWETH, “WE KEEP IT IN OUR HEART”: 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST MEN AND BOYS IN THE SYRIA CRISIS (2017). 
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complex web of suppliers. Suppliers’ self-determination of 
applicable standards means information gathered may be of 
no use to, or even hinder, future accountability efforts. And 
the ever-changing landscape of investigating bodies renders 
difficult the provision of informed consent for future sharing 
of information.  
If these challenges could be overcome, however, the 
increase in suppliers of information has the potential to 
improve the odds of obtaining accountability for victims of 
atrocity crimes. What the investigative landscape requires is 
a regulatory framework so that suppliers will provide 
credible and reliable information that has been gathered in an 
ethical manner, and demanders will have more efficient 
access to that information. 
This paper provides that framework. Its foundation 
lies in Mark Kersten’s discussion of the “market place for the 
collection of atrocity evidence”.3 In examining this 
marketplace, Kersten focuses on the Syrian context and 
highlights other actors on the supply side, potential 
coordination and collaboration problems within the 
marketplace, as well as the potential for the United Nations’ 
                                                 
 
 
3 Mark Kersten, What counts as evidence of Syria’s war crimes?, WASHINGTON 
POST, October 28, 2014,____________________________________________ 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2014/10/28/what-counts-as-evidence-of-syrias-war-crimes/ 
(last visited Apr 2, 2018). 
372 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 26 
IIIM4 to play a role in coordinating amongst the various actors 
involved.5  
This paper builds upon Kersten’s initial exploration of 
the market,6 examining the reasons for an increase in 
suppliers, the key players involved in the Syrian context, and 
the unique challenges and opportunities associated with the 
market for information about these crimes. It then provides a 
new regulatory framework responsive to these challenges. 
This model, combining elements of the United Nations’ IIIM, 
the regulatory framework for private military companies, and 
the humanitarian cluster approach, would endure beyond the 
Syrian context to provide a stronger foundation for 
accountability in future conflicts. 
 
II. THE CONDITIONS ENCOURAGING AN INCREASE IN 
SUPPLIERS 
                                                 
 
 
4 The “International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in 
the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most 
Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab 
Republic since March 2011”, which is discussed in further detail in 
Chapter Two-IV-B and Chapter Four-II. 
5 Kersten, supra note 3; Mark Kersten, How a new U.N. resolution could — 
someday — bring justice to Syria, WASHINGTON POST, December 30, 2016, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2016/12/30/how-a-new-u-n-resolution-could-someday-bring-
justice-to-syria/ (last visited Apr 2, 2018).  
6 The paper will refer to a market for “information” rather than for 
“evidence”, however, to distinguish the role of individuals, organizations, 
and institutions involved in information-gathering and fact-finding from 
that of judicial organs involved in collecting, producing or assessing 
evidence. 
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Central to any marketplace is its product. The basic 
product within the marketplace for the investigation of 
atrocities is what one would expect: information about 
massive human rights violations and/or international crimes. 
An analysis of the nature of this product illustrates why it is 
that such a large variety of actors can produce it. That they 
can produce it, however, does not explain why they choose to 
do so. Consideration is therefore given to the purposes for 
which such information may be produced, and how the 
shortcomings of the traditional investigative framework 
create space for new actors to enter.  
An initial point is necessary before launching into the 
discussion. As is noted below, information may be collected 
for a number of purposes. The standard of proof in criminal 
proceedings is exactingly high, requiring proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Not all actors will be able to collect 
information admissible in criminal proceedings, nor will they 
necessarily collect information with future criminal 
proceedings in mind. This paper does not suggest that they 
should. Information is not only useful for prosecutions if it 
can itself be admitted and relied upon in a criminal 
proceeding. Reports by non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), which may have limited utility within a criminal 
trial,7 may still provide significant assistance in identifying 
                                                 
 
 
7 For instance, although the International Criminal Court’s Pre-Trial 
Chamber criticized the Office of the Prosecutor’s reliance on NGO reports 
and press articles as evidence establishing key elements of its case, it noted 
they might provide “a useful introduction to the historical context of a 
conflict situation”: Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No.ICC-02/11-
01/11, Decision adjourning the hearing on the confirmation of the charges 
¶ 35 (June 2013)_________________________________________________ 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_04878.pdf. In Sweden, 
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crimes to be investigated and highlighting where evidence 
and/or witnesses may be located.8 Additionally, actors are 
likely to be investigating the same crimes and potentially 
speaking with the same witnesses regardless of the standard 
of proof applied. As such, this paper does not limit the 
marketplace to those actors who collect information 
specifically with future criminal proceedings in mind.   
 
A. NATURE OF THE PRODUCT 
The information produced for this marketplace can 
take a number of different forms, each with its own benefits 
and shortcomings when it comes to its use in criminal 
investigations and prosecutions. Hearsay, for instance, may 
be a highly useful tool early on in investigations, providing 
background context and directing investigators to potential 
witnesses and evidence.9 It also does not necessarily present 
the same challenges for witness protection, given the lack of a 
specific original source, although care should be given to 
whether the hearsay is capable of placing individuals or 
groups in danger. As a form of evidence in court or a source 
for advocacy, however, hearsay is likely far less credible and 
reliable than other direct forms of evidence.10 
                                                 
 
 
NGO reports have been admitted and considered to be credible 
background evidence: HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “THESE ARE THE CRIMES WE 
ARE FLEEING”: JUSTICE FOR SYRIA IN SWEDISH AND GERMAN COURTS 58 
(2017). 
8 PANEL OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS, EXPERT INITIATIVE ON PROMOTING 
EFFECTIVENESS AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 67 (2014). 
9 Id. 
10 Although it is important to note that, unlike in common law 
jurisdictions, there is no presumption of inadmissibility of hearsay before 
the ICC and the international tribunals. See the discussion in David 
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Direct witness interviews are another form of 
information, and one that is considered to be highly 
valuable.11 Interviews may have widely varied 
characteristics. They may consist of sworn or affirmed 
testimony, or they may be unsworn. They may be recorded 
by audio or video, or written notes may be taken on the 
content of the interview. The nature of the questions asked 
may be open-ended or leading. Interviews may be conducted 
of individuals, or of groups. How an interview is conducted 
is likely to impact the overall credibility and reliability of the 
information given. While direct witness testimony is 
potentially more valuable than hearsay, witnesses may be 
endangered due to their providing information. Assuming 
that they can even be located after the initial interview, which 
may take places years prior to any potential criminal trial, 
they may also be unwilling or unable to testify.  
Documents collected during an investigation may 
include “autopsy reports, court records, military personnel 
records, official press statements and public speeches”.12 This 
information removes some of the concerns with respect to 
witness availability and witness protection. It may also be 
highly reliable, provided it can be authenticated. However, 
preserving this form of information requires infrastructure, 
institutional support and, where the documents are to be used 
                                                 
 
 
Weissbrodt, Ferhat Pekin & Amelia Wilson, Piercing the Confidentiality Veil: 
Physician Testimony in International Criminal Trials Against Perpetrators of 
Torture, 15 MINN. J. INT’L L. 43, 58–60 (2006).    
11 See e.g. OHCHR, COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY AND FACT-FINDING MISSIONS 
ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW: GUIDANCE 
AND PRACTICE 43 (2015). 
12 Id. at 44. 
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in a future criminal trial, a clear outline of the “chain of 
custody”.13  
Information may also take the form of videos and 
photographs. Investigators may look to satellite photographs, 
sourced from commercial providers, to examine a landscape 
before and after an alleged event.14 Photos and videos may 
also be taken on smartphones by individuals present at the 
scene of an event, who may then provide them directly to 
investigators or post them to online platforms such as 
Facebook, Twitter, or YouTube.15 Perpetrators may also take 
or post photographs or videos.16 This type of information may 
provide compelling indicia of previously unknown crimes or 
additional perspectives on those which have already been 
documented.17 However, determining the authenticity and 
veracity of these sources requires significant time and 
financial resources.18 
                                                 
 
 
13 ELIZABETH MILLER & CHRISTINA SCHICIANO, DESIGNING COMMISSIONS OF 
INQUIRY WITH A VIEW TOWARDS PROMOTING ACCOUNTABILITY: A REPORT 
TO THE OFFICE OF GLOBAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (J/GCJ) & THE BUREAU OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS (IO) 16 (2016). 
14 OHCHR, supra note 11 at 45. 
15 See Id. at 44.; KELLY MATHESON, VIDEO AS EVIDENCE: FIELD GUIDE 178 
(2016). 
16 See e.g. the ICC’s recent arrest warrant for Mahmoud Mustafa Busayf 
Al-Werfalli, which appears to have been based in part on materials posted 
on social media by the Media Centre of the Al-Saiqa Brigade: Prosecutor 
v. Mahmoud Mustahfa Busayf Al-Werfalli, Case No.ICC-01/11-01/17, 
Warrant of Arrest ¶ 3 (15 August 2017) https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2017_05031.PDF.  
17 OHCHR, supra note 11 at 44. 
18 See Id. at 44.; MATHESON, supra note 15 at 172–175. for steps to take in 
verifying open source video. 
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Where photos or videos are shared online, they fall 
within the broader category of “open source intelligence”, 
that is, information and sources generally available to the 
public.19 Other forms of open source intelligence include 
news reports and academic publications.20 This form of 
information provides a number of benefits: it does not require 
investigators to travel to dangerous locations; it allows for 
online collaboration in determining veracity and authenticity; 
and it potentially allows for fewer witnesses to testify, while 
bolstering the credibility of those who do.21 A key challenge, 
however, concerns the reliability of open source intelligence – 
these materials are often circumstantial, and are likely to 
require corroboration or interpretation in order to be utilized 
at a criminal trial.22 There is also significant uncertainty 
surrounding its potential admissibility as evidence, given it 
has been largely untested in front of international tribunals.23     
What emerges from this brief overview of the nature of 
the product is the ease with which actors of varying sizes and 
levels of sophistication can produce it. While storing and 
authenticating information is likely to be more resource-
intensive, taking a video simply requires a camera or a 
smartphone. Conducting an interview requires only a subject. 
The product is therefore such that it can be produced by a 
wide variety of actors. The question is why these actors 
choose to do so. 
 
                                                 
 
 
19 Keith Hiatt, Open Source Evidence on Trial, 125 YALE L.J. FORUM 323, 324. 
20 Id. at 324. 
21 Id. at 325. 
22 Id. at 326–327. 
23 Id. at 327. 
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B. PURPOSES OF THE PRODUCT 
 
Actors who look to gather information on human 
rights violations and/or international crimes may do so to 
establish an evidentiary basis for future criminal trials.24 But 
this is not the only reason for collecting information about 
atrocities. Actors may seek to shine a light on crimes or 
human rights violations, perhaps to spur action or to shame a 
government into changing its behavior.25 They may feel that 
certain incidents or regions are being ignored or given 
insufficient attention by other actors or the international 
community. Actors may also want to create an historical 
record, so that events cannot be denied in the future, or they 
may want to contradict an official narrative of events. Or 
actors may be influenced by a combination of these factors,26 
or other factors not listed. What allows them the space to enter 
the marketplace, in addition to the ease of producing the 
product, are the limitations associated with traditional 
suppliers in the international criminal law field.   
 
C. SHORTCOMINGS OF TRADITIONAL SUPPLIERS 
 
When one thinks about who is responsible for 
investigating serious crimes, the actor that immediately 
springs to mind is the state. This may be via its police force, 
its security apparatus, or other state institutions tasked with 
                                                 
 
 
24 See the discussion of the Commission for International Justice and 
Accountability (CIJA) in Chapter Two-I-C. 
25 Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International are examples of 
organizations applying this “naming and shaming” approach. 
26 See the discussion of the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) in 
Chapter Two-I-B below. 
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conducting investigations. In situations of conflict or 
repression, however, those institutions may face significant 
challenges to their ability to carry out meaningful 
investigations. In extreme cases, institutions may virtually 
cease to exist. In others, the institutions may remain but turn 
a blind eye to atrocities perpetrated by state actors, including 
those in the security sectors.  
Who then conducts investigations? With the 
emergence of international criminal law, investigators tied to 
international criminal tribunals,27 hybrid criminal tribunals,28 
and the International Criminal Court (ICC) have at times 
attempted to fill the void. It is beyond the scope of this paper 
to consider how each of these institutions has conducted its 
investigations. The case of the ICC, however, provides a clear 
example of this approach as well as the limitations attached.  
 
i. Investigations at the ICC 
 
In order for the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) at the 
ICC to conduct an investigation, the ICC must have 
jurisdiction over a situation. The ICC has jurisdiction over 
four categories of crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, and the crime of aggression.29 Its jurisdiction is 
limited to situations where: (1) the crime is committed on the 
territory of a State Party; (2) the crime is committed by the 
                                                 
 
 
27 E.g. the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 
28 E.g. the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), and the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon (STL). 
29 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 13, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute] at art. 5. 
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national of a State Party; or (3) a non-State Party accepts the 
Court’s jurisdiction “with respect to the crime in question”.30 
Additionally, the crime must have been committed within the 
temporal jurisdiction of the court.31 
The ICC may exercise its jurisdiction where: (1) a State 
Party refers a situation involving the alleged commission of 
one or more crimes to the OTP; (2) the United Nations (UN) 
Security Council refers such a situation to the OTP; or (3) the 
Prosecutor initiates an investigation on her own initiative.32 
Where the UN Security Council refers a matter, the ICC may 
exercise its jurisdiction regardless of the territory on which 
the crimes have allegedly been perpetrated, or the 
nationalities of the alleged perpetrators.33 In other words, the 
Security Council has the authority to refer to the ICC both 
State Parties and non-States Party. 
In exercising its jurisdiction, the OTP will conduct a 
preliminary examination of the situation and, upon the 
satisfaction of certain criteria,34 open an investigation.35 
During the course of that investigation, and provided it is 
permitted to by the state in question, the OTP will typically 
send missions to the country being investigated; collect 
                                                 
 
 
30 Id. at art. 12. 
31 Id. at art. 11. 
32 Id. at art. 13. 
33 Id. at art. 13(b). 
34 These include, among others, “if the crimes were committed after 1 July 
2002…; if they amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity or 
genocide; the gravity of these crimes; if there are no genuine investigations 
or prosecutions for the same crimes at the national level; and if opening 
an investigation would not serve the interests of justice and of victims”: 
Office of the Prosecutor, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/otp (last visited Apr 2, 2018). 
35 Id. 
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evidence; and interview alleged perpetrators, victims, and 
witnesses.36 As perhaps goes without saying, any 
investigation and evidence-gathering will require 
cooperation from the state concerned, including from its 
domestic police forces.37 The OTP is then responsible for 
determining whether to seek to proceed to trial, and for 
conducting any eventual prosecutions.38  
 
ii. Limitations of the ICC’s investigative capacities 
 
Even from this cursory overview of the ICC’s 
jurisdiction and investigative procedures, several challenges 
are immediately apparent. The first relates to the ICC’s lack 
of jurisdiction over non-States Parties. In cases of non-States 
Parties, absent a Security Council resolution, the ICC will not 
have jurisdiction to commence a preliminary examination, let 
alone an investigation. Syria, which is not party to the Rome 
Statute, provides such an example. While the ICC has 
jurisdiction over nationals of State Parties participating in the 
Syrian conflict, it would need a Security Council referral in 
order to have jurisdiction over crimes committed by Syrians 
or nationals of other non-States Party in Syria.39 Given the 
certainty of a Russian veto of any ICC referral, the first three 
                                                 
 
 
36 Id. 
37 Zhu Wenqi, On co-operation by states not party to the International Criminal 
Court, 88 IRRC 87, 96 (2006). 
38 Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 34. 
39 See the discussion in Jennifer Trahan, NEW PATHS TO ACCOUNTABILITY 
FOR CRIMES IN SYRIA AND IRAQ (INCLUDING ICC JURISDICTION OVER 
FOREIGN FIGHTERS) JUST SECURITY (2014),________________________ 
https://www.justsecurity.org/17308/paths-accountability-crimes-syria-
iraq-including-icc-jurisdiction-foreign-fighters/ (May 27, 2018). 
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years of the Syrian conflict passed without any such vote.40 
An eventual referral resolution was proposed in May 2014, 
but rejected due to vetoes by Russia and China.41 
Consequently, the ICC’s ability to investigate crimes 
committed in the Syrian conflict is limited.  
Even if the ICC acquires jurisdiction over the broader 
Syrian conflict and the OTP ultimately commences an 
investigation, significant challenges to the collection of 
evidence remain. One such challenge stems from the ICC’s 
reliance on state cooperation. The ICC may accept 
voluntarily-provided information from NGOs, but it must 
obtain permission from the state concerned before its 
investigators travel to obtain these materials.42 The ICC may 
never obtain that cooperation or may obtain cooperation at a 
time far removed from the commission of the crimes in 
question. For instance, the Security Council referred Libya to 
the ICC in February 2011. 43 Although the ICC issued arrest 
warrants in May 2011, investigators were only deployed to 
Libya in October of that year.44 The government of Sudan has 
refused to cooperate with the OTP, including by denying it 
access to its territory.45 The inability to be on the ground right 
                                                 
 
 
40 Stephen J. Rapp, Overcoming the Challenges to Achieving Justice for Syria, 
30 EMORY INTL. L. REV. 155, 158 (2015). 
41 Id. 
42 Alex Whiting, Dynamic Investigative Practices at the International Criminal 
Court, 76 L. AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 163, 183 (2013). 
43 Kersten, supra note 3. 
44 Id. 
45 See OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, TWENTY-SIXTH REPORT PURSUANT TO 
PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE UN SECURITY RESOLUTION (UNSCR) 1593 (2005) 37 
(2017); Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, before the United 
Nations Security Council on the Situation in Darfur, pursuant to UNSCR 
1593 (2005), INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2016), https://www.icc-
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away, or even at all, limits the ICC’s access to information and 
evidence.  
Another challenge stems from the significant 
complexity and cost of international criminal investigations 
and the resource constraints facing the ICC. Stuart Ford 
examines the nine situations that the ICC was investigating or 
had investigated as of July 2015, making the following 
observations: 
To put this all together, the typical ICC investigation 
covers a variety of war crimes and crimes against humanity 
committed during the course of an armed conflict. The ICC 
will usually investigate crimes committed at between twenty 
and thirty separate crime sites over a period of several months 
to several years. These crimes are typically carried out by 
sophisticated, hierarchically organized armed groups, and 
the resulting violence is systematic and widespread. In most 
cases, the ICC will investigate more than one perpetrator 
group. The typical ICC investigation will cover crimes that 
resulted in the murder of more than a thousand people, the 
rape of anywhere from hundreds to thousands of people, 
serious injury to thousands, and the displacement by violence 
of hundreds of thousands to millions of people. The victims 
of these crimes will overwhelmingly be civilians, including 
many women and children. Usually, the perpetrators commit 
their crimes with a discriminatory motive. Moreover, the 
                                                 
 
 
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=161213-otp-stat-unsc-darfur (last visited 
May 27, 2018). 
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violence is often carried out in particularly cruel or brutal 
ways.46 
One investigation with these characteristics would, on 
its own, present manifold challenges. As of February 2019, the 
OTP was investigating situations in eleven countries.47 As 
Nicole De Silva points out, conducting these types of 
investigations “demands substantial local knowledge and 
access, as well as considerable financial resources and 
personnel.”48 As discussed above, the OTP may not have local 
access. It additionally tends to have limited local experience.49  
The OTP also lacks the requisite financial resources 
and personnel. Part of this was an institutional choice – states 
designed the ICC to be relatively small in size, to possess 
limited investigative capacities, and to encourage states to 
prosecute their own cases rather than have such cases proceed 
at the ICC.50 Even as the ICC’s caseload has grown, it has been 
given limited financial support from the ICC’s Assembly of 
States Parties.51 And its budget is simply not commensurate 
                                                 
 
 
46 Stuart Ford, What Investigative Resources does the International Criminal 
Court Need to Succeed? A Gravity-Based Approach, 16 WASHINGTON 
UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES L. REV. 1, 35 (2017). 
47 Situations under investigation, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/Situations.aspx (last visited Feb 10, 
2019). The countries being investigated were: Burundi, Georgia, Central 
African Republic (two situations), Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Kenya, 
Sudan, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
48 Nicole De Silva, Intermediary Complexity in Regulatory Governance: The 
International Criminal Court’s Use of NGOs in Regulating International 
Crimes, 670 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND 
SOCIAL SCIENCE 170, 177 (2017). 
49 Id. 
50 Whiting, supra note 42 at 176. 
51 De Silva, supra note 48 at 177. 
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with the gravity of the crimes it investigates. Ford ultimately 
concludes that, in comparison with similarly grave domestic 
investigations in Western Europe and the United States, the 
ICC is “enormously under-resourced”.52  
This lack of resources limits the number of 
investigators available to any particular investigation, and 
requires the OTP to make choices as to which investigations 
to prioritize given the reality of limited resources.53 It has also 
contributed to criticism by judges at the ICC when the OTP 
has been unable to meet the high standards demanded by the 
Court in conducting its investigations and presenting 
evidence.54 
The case study of the ICC therefore illustrates many of 
the challenges facing international criminal prosecutors 
looking to investigate and ultimately prosecute atrocity 
crimes. The requirement of jurisdiction, the need for 
cooperation from the states in question, and the high cost of 
international criminal proceedings coupled with resource 
constraints limit these institutions’ ability to carry out 
efficient investigations. 
The ICC also provides an illustration of the response to 
these challenges. As De Silva points out, the Court relies 
heavily on assistance provided by NGO intermediaries, 
including in collecting information and identifying 
witnesses.55 The shortcomings of international criminal 
investigations therefore create an opening through which 
other actors may enter the marketplace. The results of this 
                                                 
 
 
52 Ford, supra note 46 at 65. 
53 Whiting, supra note 42 at 176–177. 
54 PANEL OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS, supra note 8 at 62–63. 
55 De Silva, supra note 48 at 181–182. 
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opening can be seen in the context of the Syrian conflict, in 
which the marketplace features a large number of different 
types of suppliers. 
 
III. THE MARKETPLACE IN THE SYRIAN CONFLICT 
The Syrian conflict provides a clear example of the 
marketplace for investigating atrocity crimes. This section of 
the paper examines the actors involved in that particular 
marketplace to provide a context that can be used to 
understand how an increase in the number of suppliers 
impacts the product in the marketplace as well as how its 
participants interact with each other and with sources. 
 
A. ACTORS ON THE SUPPLY SIDE 
There are four general subgroups which can be 
identified on the supply side: individuals, human rights 
organizations, private investigative organizations, and 
international institutions/mechanisms. The sections below 
provide a general overview of each subgroup, as well as a 
specific example of an actor within the category.  
 
i. Individuals 
 
Individuals provide crucial documentation of human 
rights violations and international crimes in Syria. A 
significant amount of these materials consist of open source 
intelligence. For example, activists uploaded videos of the 
initial peaceful protests as well as ones capturing the fallout 
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of chemical attacks and aerial bombings.56Additionally, 
militant groups have disseminated videos of beheadings, and 
government supporters have uploaded their own images.57 
One key individual source of documentation of 
international crimes in Syria is a man code-named “Caesar”. 
Caesar worked as a photographer with the Syrian military 
police in Damascus, taking photographs of crime scenes and 
accidents.58 Following the start of the Syrian conflict, Caesar 
was ordered to photograph the bodies of detainees who had 
been killed in custody, in order to document their deaths.59 
During the three years he spent taking these photographs, he 
surreptitiously made copies which he subsequently 
smuggled outside of Syria.60 Between Caesar and others 
engaged in similar acts, approximately 55,000 images had 
been made available outside of Syria as of January 2014.61 At 
least 11,000 bodies are depicted in the photographs, which 
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also contain the number associated with the Syrian prison 
facility at which death occurred.62  
 
ii. Human rights organizations 
 
Human rights organizations are also key suppliers of 
information about human rights violations and international 
crimes occurring in the context of the Syrian conflict.  
It is important to note at the outset that these groups 
vary enormously in size, scale of operation, and overall 
sophistication. Robert Charles Blitt provides a succinct 
summary of the diversity of human rights NGOs more 
broadly: 
First, human rights NGOs may operate on 
international, regional or national levels. Second, the activities 
of these organizations vary from international advocacy to 
pure fact-finding and research. Third, human rights NGOs 
may be membership-driven, or alternatively rely on 
foundational or corporate support to maintain operating 
budgets. Fourth, these organizations may use volunteers to 
undertake projects or insist on employing professional, paid 
staff members. Finally, the size of these organizations ranges 
from multimillion dollar international NGOs to small, one or 
two person operations with little or no real budget.63 
There are numerous human rights NGOs working on 
documenting the Syrian conflict. Examples of organizations 
focused specifically on Syria include the Violations 
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Documentation Center in Syria (VDC), the Syrian 
Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), the Syria Justice and 
Accountability Centre (SJAC), the Syrian Human Rights 
Committee (SHRC), the Syrian Center for Media and 
Freedom of Expression (SCM), Syrians for Truth and Justice, 
the Syrian Institute for Justice, the Syrian Center for Studies 
and Human Rights, the Syrian Center for Statistics and 
Research, the Syrian Archive, and the Syrian Network for 
Human Rights (SNHR). Other organizations such as Human 
Rights Watch and Amnesty International, which do not focus 
solely on the Syrian conflict, have also conducted 
investigations into atrocities within Syria.64  
SNHR provides an example, although by no means an 
exhaustive one, of the type of work carried out by these 
organizations. Founded in June 2011, SNHR characterizes 
itself as “an independent, non-partisan, non-profit 
organization [which] doesn’t work by any ideology.”65 It is 
registered as a non-profit limited liability company in the 
United Kingdom, and a non-profit organization in the United 
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States.66 It is governed by a five-member Board of Directors, 
with an administrative structure consisting of an executive 
director who manages seven divisions.67 It employs 27 full-
time staff, and relies on the support of over 70 volunteers, 
including activists and human rights defenders in Syria, 
Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, and other countries.68  
SNHR describes its goals as preserving the rights of 
victims, working towards criminal accountability, supporting 
transitional justice, memorializing victims, and supporting 
social and political advocacy.69 It focuses on documentation, 
including of the civilian death toll, those who have been 
detained or forcibly disappeared, deaths due to torture, 
deaths of medical personnel, and the use of barrel bombs.70 It 
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also provides training to human rights defenders in Syria, and 
works to raise awareness of applicable international law.71  
 
iii. Private investigative organizations 
 
The Commission for International Justice and 
Accountability (CIJA) is an example of a relatively new type 
of actor in the marketplace. CIJA is a private NGO which 
investigates and documents crimes committed in the Syrian 
conflict.72 It also looks to crimes committed by the Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which involves conducting 
investigations in both Syria and Iraq. CIJA was started in late 
2011, with the organization formalized in 2012.73 It is 
registered as a non-profit organization in The Hague.74  
CIJA employs approximately the same number of 
investigators as the ICC, as well as military and political 
analysts, lawyers, and translators, for a total staff of around 
140.75 A significant portion of its staff is made up of Syrians 
and Iraqis working in Syria, Iraq, and other countries.76 Thirty 
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analysts and legal experts work at the organization’s 
European headquarters.77 
CIJA has an annual budget of €5 million for its 
investigations in Syria and Iraq, with €4 million directed 
specifically at Syria.78 It receives funding from the 
development programs of a number of Western countries, 
including Canada, Denmark, Germany, Norway, and the 
United Kingdom; as well as from the European Union.79 It 
previously received funding from the United States, but this 
was cut in 2014.80 
CIJA focuses its attention on understanding the 
institutions and organizations responsible for perpetrating 
crimes in order to establish the criminal liability of those near 
or at the top of the chain of command.81 To do so, the 
organization focuses on “linkage evidence”, which looks to 
connect high-ranking officials to the plethora of abuses that 
have been documented by the media and other 
organizations.82 CIJA then uses this information to compile 
legal briefs for future prosecutions.83 As of April 2018, the 
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organization had compiled ten case files addressing crimes 
committed by the Syrian regime in Syria, as well as by ISIS in 
both Syria and Iraq.84 Each case file covers a different number 
of alleged perpetrators, for a total of approximately 60-70 
individuals.85 While some focus on specific Syrian 
governorates, others look to the top of the governing structure 
including President Bashar al-Assad and his inner circle.86   
As a result of its focus on linkage evidence, CIJA’s 
primary emphasis is on documentation produced by state 
organs involved in the crimes in question as opposed to 
interviews of victims and witnesses.87 As of April 2018, CIJA 
had extracted over 800,000 pages of documents from Syria.88 
The documentation is stored, scanned, and reviewed by CIJA 
analysts.89 In order to obtain the documents, CIJA has needed 
to cooperate with opposition forces.90 As a result, much of its 
focus is on crimes linked to the Syrian regime or to ISIS, and 
not opposition forces.91 This is not to say, however, that CIJA 
focuses exclusively on documentation, or that it never 
investigates opposition forces. The organization also collects 
and analyzes videos downloaded to its servers, documenting 
key data including the location of the video and any 
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identifiable victims or perpetrators.92 The videos are then 
utilized in investigating opposition crimes.93 
The organization’s secondary focus is on 
“collaborating evidence”, meaning information gathered 
from regime officials who either continue to operate within 
the regime or who have defected.94 It relies the least on 
information from the direct victims of atrocities, as this is 
perceived as less useful for building links between the 
immediate perpetrators to individuals further up the chain of 
command.95 When it does interview victims, CIJA focuses on 
those who have remained in Syria, who have not previously 
spoken to reporters or other organizations, and who are able 
to help establish “pattern evidence” illustrating the 
systematic nature of the crimes perpetrated.96   
 
iv. International institutions/mechanisms 
 
The Independent International Commission of Inquiry 
on the Syrian Arab Republic (COI) is an international body 
that supplies information on atrocities committed in the 
Syrian conflict. The UN Human Rights Council (HRC) created 
the COI in a special session in August 2011,97 after a fact-
finding mission by the Office of the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR) found that incidents in Syria 
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might amount to crimes against humanity.98 The HRC 
mandated the COI to “establish the facts and circumstances 
that may amount to such violations and of the crimes 
perpetrated and, where possible, to identify those responsible 
with a view to ensuring that perpetrators of violations, 
including those that may constitute crimes against humanity, 
are held accountable”.99 It focuses on providing public reports 
on “recent incidents and broad patterns of violations and 
abuses.”100 
In interpreting its mandate, the COI determined it was 
to act as a fact-finding body, using the standard of proof of 
“reasonable suspicion”.101 This is a lower standard of proof 
than beyond a reasonable doubt. To establish facts, the COI 
has reached out to a number of actors, including states, 
regional groups and organizations, experts, NGOs, activists, 
and members of the media.102 It has also looked to reports, 
academic works, media reports, audio materials, and 
videos.103 
Syria has refused to cooperate with the COI, and so the 
COI has completed its investigations primarily through 
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interviews conducted from outside of the country.104 It has, 
however, also interviewed victims and witnesses inside Syria 
via telephone and Skype.105 As of April 2018, the COI had 
conducted interviews with more than 6,000 individuals.106  
 
B. INTERMEDIARY ACTORS 
 
This paper uses the term “intermediary actors” to refer 
to those actors in the marketplace who both supply and 
demand information concerning human rights violations and 
international crimes. This may seem like an artificial 
distinction at first, seeing as many of the suppliers listed 
above demand information as well – an NGO or the COI may 
look to individuals for information or documentation for 
example, or individuals may look to other individuals. 
However, the entities discussed in this section can be 
distinguished from pure suppliers given their emphasis on 
the collection of previously gathered information as opposed 
to the creation or initial gathering of information. As a result, 
these actors take on more of a “middleman” role.107  
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i. NGO intermediaries 
 
The Syrian Accountability Project (SAP) is an example 
of an NGO intermediary actor. SAP is “a cooperative effort 
between activists, non-governmental organizations, students, 
and other interested parties to document war crimes and 
crimes against humanity in the context of the Syrian crisis.”108 
It consists of a project leader, chief of staff, three teams 
(research, investigation, and unit mapping), a special 
investigator for sexual crimes, and a special researcher for 
civil liability.109 It was founded in 2011, and is based out of 
Syracuse University College of Law.110 
SAP compiles and analyzes open source intelligence, 
“walk-in information”111, and information provided by a 
clandestine network within Syria.112 It also looks to 
eyewitness, government, media, and NGO reports.113 SAP’s 
database contains crimes allegedly perpetrated by the Syrian 
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regime, ISIS, members of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), and 
others.114 
SAP consolidates the information it gathers into two 
primary documents: the “Conflict Narrative”, which tells the 
story of the conflict as a series of events; and the “Crime Base 
Matrix”, which sorts events based on whether they constitute 
crimes under Syrian or international law.115 It also drafts 
sample indictments, and is attempting to use the Conflict 
Narrative and other reports to map the movement of armed 
units and determine which commanders are criminally 
responsible for specific incidents.116 SAP further uses the 
information gathered to produce “trial packages” for future 
prosecutors and, in some cases, to draft white papers on 
particular incidents.117 
 
ii. International intermediaries  
 
An example of an international intermediary actor is 
the IIIM. In December 2016, the UN General Assembly 
adopted a resolution creating the “International, Impartial 
and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation 
and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious 
Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian 
Arab Republic since March 2011”.118 It mandated the IIIM to: 
collect, consolidate, preserve and analyse evidence of 
violations of international humanitarian law and human 
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rights violations and abuses and to prepare files in order to 
facilitate and expedite fair and independent criminal 
proceedings, in accordance with international law standards, 
in national, regional or international courts or tribunals that 
have or may in the future have jurisdiction over these crimes, 
in accordance with international law[.]119 
This focus on criminal law standards distinguishes the 
IIIM from other fact-finding bodies, including the COI.120 It 
also shapes the nature of the information to be collected by 
the IIIM, namely “evidence that establishes linkages, mens rea, 
and modes of criminal liability so that alleged crimes can be 
attributed to those responsible.”121  
The IIIM will collect materials that already exist, some 
produced by the Syrian regime and others collected by 
individuals working alone or for NGOs.122 It will gather 
information in the hands of states, civil society actors, the 
private sector, and other U.N. bodies.123 It will also analyze 
gaps in the existing materials, and use its investigate powers 
to fill those gaps in creating case files.124 Case files will include 
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not only information, but also analysis based on criminal law 
methodologies so that the files can be used as the foundation 
for future prosecutions.125  
It is important to note what the IIIM is not. It is not a 
court, nor is it a prosecuting body.126 Rather, as an institution 
with a “quasi-prosecutorial function”, the IIIM will support 
efforts to achieve accountability in jurisdictions including 
national courts as well as any existing or future court(s) later 
given jurisdiction over the Syrian conflict.127 In order for 
government prosecutors to obtain information or case files 
from the IIIM, they must demonstrate “a continuous and 
successful effort by their governments to uphold 
internationally recognized standards of human rights and 
due process.”128 The IIIM will only share information where 
the death penalty would not apply.129 The existence of the 
IIIM does not prevent NGOs from filing their own criminal 
cases.130 
Considering the nature and breadth of its mandate, the 
IIIM has been equipped with a relatively lean staff and 
budget.131 As of March 2018, its team included approximately 
20 members but was expected to grow to a staff of 60 people 
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as the year progressed.132 Its budget for the year, based on 
voluntary contributions as the General Assembly had yet to 
approve regular budget funding for the Mechanism, was 
estimated to be $14 million.133 It does not accept funds from 
non-state actors.134 
The IIIM has the legal capacity to enter into agreements 
with states and other actors.135 Cooperation with the IIIM, 
however, is completely voluntary.136 As it currently stands, 
the IIIM has no access to the Syrian territory.137 
 
C. ACTORS ON THE DEMAND SIDE 
 
Just as actors may not only produce information of 
human rights violations and/or international crimes for the 
purpose of criminal proceedings, so too may demand actors 
have motivations for seeking out this product aside from 
criminal prosecutions. As a result, a range of actors can be 
identified on the demand side in addition to criminal 
prosecutors.  
 
i. Individuals 
 
Individuals may want information about human rights 
violations and international crimes for a variety of reasons. 
Journalists or media outlets, for example, may look to 
suppliers to produce news reports or stories. Activists may 
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want to obtain information in order to use it in lobbying for 
political or social change. Academics may seek out 
documentation of crimes in support of their analysis and 
publications. Individuals involved in the conflict may want 
information to identify and silence victims, witnesses, or 
sources. They may look to have materials destroyed or 
deleted.138 They may also want to use information selectively 
or inaccurately in order to produce a biased or inaccurate 
narrative of the conflict.     
 
ii. Human rights organizations 
 
Human rights organizations may also provide demand 
for information on human rights violations and international 
crimes. For instance, Human Rights Watch gained access to 
the Caesar photographs for research purposes.139 It then used 
these photographs to draft a report on mass death and torture 
in Syrian detention facilities.140 Likewise, Amnesty 
International utilized information gathered by SNHR in a 
report outlining war crimes and human rights violations in 
Aleppo.141 The U.S.-based Center for Justice & Accountability 
(CJA) relied in part on materials and analysis provided by 
CIJA to pursue a civil complaint against the Assad regime for 
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its role in the 2012 death of war correspondent Marie Colvin 
in Syria.142 In January 2019, a U.S. federal court found the 
Syrian Arab Republic liable for Colvin’s death, and issued an 
award of approximately U.S. $302 million to Colvin’s 
relatives.143 
 
iii. States 
 
States demand information on war crimes and human 
rights violations not only for prosecutions, which will be 
discussed in the subsection below, but also for their own 
policy decisions and for immigration matters. For example, 
SAP produced a white paper on the siege and destruction of 
Aleppo144 so that policymakers and diplomats could have 
access to information about the ongoing atrocities while 
understanding their context and significance.145 The U.S. State 
Department utilized information from SNHR in its 2015 
Human Rights Report on Syria.146 And CIJA regularly 
receives requests from European and North American 
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governments for information to be used in immigration 
screening procedures.147 
 
iv. Domestic and international prosecutors 
 
As it currently stands, there is no international court 
with jurisdiction to try crimes committed in the Syrian 
conflict.148 As noted above, the ICC does not have jurisdiction 
as Syria is not a State Party, and vetoes from Russia and China 
have prevented a UN Security Council referral. It is possible 
that, in the future, there could be an international justice 
option for Syria. This could be via the ICC, if the landscape 
changed such that Syria accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction over 
the situation or the Security Council found a way to overcome 
its current paralysis. A draft statute has been proposed for a 
hybrid tribunal, should the ICC not acquire jurisdiction over 
the conflict.149 In the past, the U.S. also advocated for the 
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eventual creation of a hybrid tribunal, similar to the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC).150  All of these options, however, would require 
significant shifts in current political realities, and are unlikely 
to be realized in the foreseeable future. If an international 
prosecutorial body eventually emerges, however, it will 
provide a sizeable demand for information concerning 
atrocities.   
In the interim, national prosecutors able to exercise 
universal jurisdiction151 demand information on human 
rights violations and international crimes. National 
prosecutors in Sweden secured the first conviction of a 
member of the Syrian military in September 2017.152 
Prosecutors have laid charges in Norway, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, and Germany.153 And the sister of a man 
identified in the Caesar photographs has filed a criminal 
                                                 
 
 
150 Rapp, supra note 40 at 160. 
151 Universal jurisdiction allows states to prosecute offences regardless of 
whether a link exists between the prosecuting state and the offence, 
offender, or victim: Roger O’Keefe, Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the 
Basic Concept, 2 JICJ 735, 745–746 (2004). 
152 Anne Barnard, Syrian Soldier is Guilty of a War Crime, a First in the 6-Year 
Conflict, NEW YORK TIMES (October 3, 2017),________________________ 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/world/middleeast/syria-war-
crime.html?_r=0 (last visited Jan 6, 2018). 
153 Patrick Kroker & Alexandra Lily Kather, JUSTICE FOR SYRIA? 
OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION TRIALS IN 
GERMANY EJIL: TALK! (2016), https://www.ejiltalk.org/justice-for-syria-
opportunities-and-limitations-of-universal-jurisdiction-trials-in-
germany/> (last visited Jan 6, 2018); For a discussion of the use of 
universal jurisdiction in Europe and, in particular, its use in prosecuting 
international crimes in Germany, see Wolfgang Kaleck & Patrick Kroker, 
Syrian Torture Investigations in Germany and Beyond, 16 JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 165 (2018). 
406 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 26 
complaint in Spain against nine members of the Syrian 
regime.154  
National prosecutors look to the suppliers listed above 
for information and materials to be used in building their 
cases. For instance, a sizeable portion of CIJA’s operations 
involve providing assistance to primarily European 
jurisdictions looking to locate alleged perpetrators hiding 
amidst the large numbers of legitimate refugees entering 
Europe.155 Prosecutors request both information regarding 
potential suspects as well as analysis of materials that have 
been collected.156  
Information and materials provided by suppliers is 
crucial to national prosecutors’ abilities to investigate cases, 
lay charges, and pursue convictions. As a result, it is 
important to understand how an increase in the number and 
variety of suppliers impacts the product and interactions 
within the marketplace. 
 
IV. The Impact of Increased Suppliers on the 
Marketplace 
The impact of an increase in suppliers on the 
marketplace can be seen in four key areas. The first is the 
quantity of the product available in the marketplace. The 
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second relates to the quality of that product, with quality 
referring to the information’s credibility and reliability, and, 
relatedly, whether it is likely admissible in future criminal 
proceedings or can provide the basis for future criminal 
investigations. The third is the ease with which demanders 
can access the information they seek. And the fourth concerns 
the ethical implications of how the product is created. 
 
A. QUANTITY OF THE PRODUCT 
 
It perhaps goes without saying that more suppliers 
mean a greater quantity of information in the marketplace. An 
increased number of suppliers allows for the broader 
coverage of topics, regions, and even time periods. Recall that 
investigators from the ICC, for example, often arrive in a 
conflict area after atrocities have taken place. With 
individuals on scene recording and uploading video as 
human rights violations or international crimes occur, 
materials are produced and available that may otherwise not 
have been. Additionally, an increased number of suppliers 
allows for the investigation of a broader range of perpetrators. 
While CIJA may place less emphasis on opposition crimes 
due to requiring opposition forces’ assistance to secure 
documentation, other organizations such as SAP step in to fill 
that gap.  
The number of suppliers involved also increases the 
variety of the types of information available. For instance, as 
noted above, the COI focuses on witness testimony. This is in 
part because Commissions of Inquiry typically lack the 
infrastructure and resources necessary to properly collect and 
categorize documents reviewed during their 
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investigations.157 Additionally, COIs are not permanent 
bodies, and so do not provide an obvious source of storage 
for materials.158 CIJA, in contrast, trains its investigators in 
how to secure documents, including maintaining chain of 
custody, and keeps the materials it has collected in storage 
facilities in Europe.159 The IIIM will also be able to store 
materials, including documents, protecting valuable 
information from being lost or destroyed.160 
Another example of a broadening of the types of 
information available is again linked to the operation of 
suppliers other than the COI. The COI typically records 
interviews in the third person “to provide additional 
protection to interviewees in the event that they become 
witnesses in future judicial proceedings.”161 This form of 
witness statement is generally inadmissible in criminal 
prosecutions.162 Conversely, CIJA takes witness statements in 
support of the creation of prosecution briefs, and so the 
statements may be more likely to have some evidentiary 
value.  
The impact on quantity also stems from the actors’ 
abilities to preserve materials that might otherwise have been 
lost. A clear example of this can be seen in the area of open 
source intelligence. In 2017, YouTube implemented new 
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policies targeting videos seen as “graphic or supporting 
terrorism”, causing hundreds of thousands of videos of the 
Syrian conflict to vanish.163 The Syrian Archive, working 
alongside activists and media groups impacted by YouTube’s 
actions, helped recover approximately 400,000 videos by 
securing the return of some 20 channels.164 It also 
downloaded some of the videos to its own server.165 VDC has 
indicated it will take a different approach and set up its own 
method of storage and a platform to use instead of 
YouTube.166 The variety in actors enables a variety of 
responses when information is threatened, and also allows for 
different methods of storage moving forward. 
A potential area of concern as the number of suppliers 
increases is the production of duplicate products. Currently, 
there is no actor which coordinates where or what a particular 
supplier investigates. Instead, individual suppliers 
themselves determine the incidents, themes and regions on 
which they will focus.  
This lack of coordination has benefits and drawbacks. 
On the one hand, it can be useful to have a variety of materials 
and information concerning one particular incident. For 
example, when multiple individuals record or photograph 
aspects of the same event, they capture different perspectives 
and share new details which may be invaluable in piecing 
together what happened and who is responsible.167 On the 
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other hand, suppliers operate in a world of finite resources. 
Where a large number of them all gather information about 
the same event, there is a risk that other events, in the Syrian 
conflict or in other contexts, may be left uninvestigated or 
insufficiently investigated.    
 
B. QUALITY OF THE PRODUCT  
 
More information does not necessarily mean better 
information. A particular supplier’s sophistication and 
resources impact on the quality of the product it is able to 
create. Some actors may gather information with a high level 
of professionalization, producing information that is credible 
and reliable. Others may have fewer resources and have had 
little or no training in gathering information on human rights 
violations or international crimes.   
In looking at the increase in citizen providers of 
information, Sam Gregory refers to what he calls “pain 
points” linked to “questions within the human rights 
community about how it manages the tensions between the 
professionalized practices of a core set of human rights 
organizations and the porous edges of the fugacious mesh of 
citizen participation in human rights documentation and 
activism, particularly as it occurs in crisis contexts.”168 He 
provides the example of the contrasting approach an 
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individual “first-hand responder” might take to an interview 
as opposed to that of a professional investigator: 
When it comes to documenting an interview on video, 
an investigator will begin by asking ‘Should I even video this 
interview?’ (Matheson, 2014). One primary concern may be 
that if an interview is recorded, and then at a later date 
(months, years, down the line) the interviewee is asked to 
testify in court (extremely rarely will the initial videotaped 
interview be used as actual evidence unless there are 
extenuating circumstances such as the interviewee has died), 
then inconsistencies between the recorded interview and in-
court testimony could undermine the witness’ credibility…. 
However, people in crisis are going to talk to other people 
(and nowadays they are going to film it) even if all the 
professional guidance in the world tells them not to interview 
or to record. So a key question emerges in terms of how one 
should bridge this gap between established professional 
practice and the realities of new entrants.169 
Another example Gregory provides relates to the 
importance of “linkage evidence” to international criminal 
prosecutions. International criminal law tends to target 
individuals who were not necessarily themselves present 
when a crime was committed, but who are still individually 
responsible for the conduct.170 Linkage evidence connects 
these higher-level perpetrators to the crime in question, 
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illustrating the manner and mode of their participation.171 
Citizens, however, tend to produce “crime-based evidence”, 
which simply shows that a crime occurred.172 This 
information may therefore be less useful in future 
prosecutions. 
Quality concerns, however, are not limited to 
individuals who unexpectedly find themselves thrust into the 
role of first-hand responder and are understandably 
unfamiliar with investigatory best practices. Human rights 
organizations may also contribute information and 
documentation of varying quality.173 This stems in part from 
the reality that no uniform standards for fact-finding exist,174 
creating a situation where organizations with vastly different 
levels of sophistication and resources are left to adopt their 
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own methods. Those with the resources to do so have 
“professionalized” their fact-finding, with structures and 
processes in place for investigations, and specially-trained 
individuals on staff.175 Others, in contrast, lack the expertise, 
time, and financial resources necessary to develop procedures 
for investigating and reporting.176 This leads to the risk that 
materials may be contaminated by an organization lacking 
the resources and expertise required for collection and 
storage.177 Inaccurate information may have ramifications 
beyond the individual report or allegation in question, if it 
calls into doubt fact-finding by NGOs more broadly.  
Additionally, suppliers may produce information that 
is highly reliable and credible, but it may simply not be what 
demanders need. For example, institutions such as the COI 
focus on documenting incidents ordered by high-level 
perpetrators.178  National prosecutors, however, often look to 
individuals, either perpetrators or victims, who happen to be 
within their specific jurisdiction.179 The incidents in which 
these individuals were involved may simply not fall within 
the situations documented by the COI. 
The challenges associated with an increase in suppliers 
in the marketplace reflect the reality that it is largely left to 
individual suppliers to determine their degree of 
professionalization, where and what they will investigate, 
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and the standards to which they will work.180 There are many 
existing standards, protocols, and best practices on which 
organizations may draw.181 CIJA, for example, has 
incorporated and improved upon best practices regarding 
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evidence collection, interviews, and chain of custody taken 
from the ICC and other ad hoc tribunals.182 Its ability to do so 
stems in large part from the expertise of its founding members 
– investigators, prosecutors, and defence counsel from 
international and hybrid tribunals with firsthand experience 
of how these practices emerged and evolved, as well as an 
understanding of their inefficiencies.183   
But not every organization will have the same 
experience upon which to draw. Additionally, the ability to 
look to best practices is constrained by available resources. 
Some of this is linked to funding – it may be expensive to 
implement certain standards, for instance IT systems to store 
and catalogue digital materials or appropriate storage 
facilities for documents, or it may require an increase in the 
number of staff. But it is also linked to time – understanding 
the available standards and choosing which to adopt takes 
time, as does the training of staff. NGOs may simply not have 
the time to fully engage in these activities. 
 
C. ACCESSIBILITY OF THE PRODUCT 
 
A key challenge that accompanies an increase in the 
number of suppliers is the ease with which demanders are 
able to access the information it is that they need.  
In some instances, prosecutors may be able to identify 
the information they need and the sources which possess it. 
Challenges may still emerge, however, in several areas. One 
such area is with respect to consent. In Sweden, prosecutors 
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have struggled to access COI information because sources 
interviewed did not provide their consent at the time of the 
interview for its contents to be shared with national 
prosecutors.184 Prosecutors may also be unable to obtain 
materials from NGOs where sources divulged information in 
confidence.185  
Other challenges emerge where suppliers lack the 
institutional capacity to effectively liaise with demanders. 
Swedish prosecutors have noted that the COI has a lack of 
staff dedicated to working with national jurisdictions, making 
cooperation with the institution difficult.186 
A crucial challenge relates to the sheer volume of 
existing information. It was estimated in 2015 that there were 
over half a million media items depicting some form of 
violation of human rights in the context of the Syrian 
conflict.187 The IIIM more recently characterized the volume 
of video and photographic materials linked to the Syrian 
conflict as “unprecedented in any other accountability 
process with respect to international crimes to date”.188  
This presents significant challenges for national 
prosecutors seeking to assess the viability of prosecutions for 
crimes committed during the Syrian conflict. In the 
Netherlands, for example, prosecutors looking to take cases 
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involving Syrian war crimes to trial look to open source 
intelligence.189 Their efforts to sort through the pieces they 
collect require significant human and financial resources.190 
And there is no guarantee that, with the expenditure of these 
resources, prosecutors will be able to establish jurisdiction.191 
They may also be wasting resources, duplicating efforts 
already undertaken by other groups unbeknownst to them.192 
Accessibility concerns are therefore coupled with efficiency 
concerns as to the use of finite resources.  
In other cases, demanders may know the information 
they need, but not know precisely where to look for it. It may 
be that one supplier has all of the materials in question, but it 
is more likely that demanders will need to look to a variety of 
actors. For instance, demand actors may need information on 
a variety of regions within Syria; however, individual 
suppliers may focus only on one particular region.193 
Moreover, depending on their mandates, suppliers may not 
naturally coordinate amongst themselves.194 They may not 
share the same views on the methods to be used in conducting 
investigations.195 They may also view new actors as 
threatening to their own interests and position in the market, 
and so may be disincentivized to work together.196 This 
means that the burden shifts to demanders to coordinate with 
multiple suppliers, which takes time and resources. It also 
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requires relationships, which demanders such as national 
prosecutors may not have with smaller or more newly 
established suppliers.197  
Some of these accessibility problems may be 
attenuated by actors who attempt to create or share a “value-
added” product. For example, instead of providing 
individual pieces of information, actors such as CIJA, SAP, 
and the IIIM put together prepared case briefs. In essence, 
they do a portion of the prosecution’s work for them, sifting 
through significant quantities of information in order to 
ascertain what is likely to assist in proving a criminal case 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The degree to which these 
products add value, however, is dependent upon the 
materials from which they are able to draw. If they are unable 
to access relevant information possessed by other suppliers, 
the case brief ultimately provided may leave out potentially 
valuable materials. The IIIM is looking to address this 
problem by establishing protocols of mutual action with 27 
Syrian NGOs, as well as international NGOs.198 Its success in 
this endeavor will greatly impact the overall quality of the 
prosecution briefs it is able to produce.  
 
D. ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CREATING THE PRODUCT 
 
An increase in the number of suppliers in the 
marketplace may have ethical ramifications, even if the 
majority of these suppliers have entered the marketplace for 
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altruistic, or at least not malicious, reasons.199 This paper will 
primarily consider two ethical issues: the no-harm principle, 
and the principle of voluntary informed consent.  
 
i. The no-harm principle 
The no-harm principle reflects professionals’ 
obligations to the individuals with whom they come into 
contact, regardless of the broader benefits anticipated to 
result from that interaction.200 Contrary to its name, the no-
harm principle does not demand that actors never cause 
harm; rather, it requires “minimizing harm and risk” to 
participants.201 
In the marketplace, more suppliers may mean 
increased variety in methods used to collect and preserve 
materials. Where this leads to a decreased focus on interviews 
as a form of information, it may decrease the risks of harm to 
individual victims and witnesses. This is because 
participation in international criminal proceedings is often 
dangerous for victims and witnesses. It is not just testifying 
which may place an individual in danger; even participating 
in an interview can put a person at risk.202 When suppliers 
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such as CIJA are able to build cases based on documentation, 
and therefore conduct fewer interviews, they put fewer 
individuals at risk of harm. This is particularly important 
given the reality of the high cost of witness protection, both to 
the entity providing protection and to the witness, who often 
has to relocate along with his or her family.203  
The other side of the coin, however, is that more 
suppliers may mean more interviews. This may place a 
greater number of individuals at risk, perhaps unnecessarily 
so. Professional investigators give significant thought to who 
they interview. For example, the OTP at the ICC takes steps 
to screen potential witnesses to ensure that it only interviews 
those who have relevant information.204 Individuals or 
groups that are less sophisticated may not undertake the same 
analysis before conducting interviews. 
More suppliers may also increase the amount of risk 
faced by particular individuals. Providing interviews to 
multiple sources increases the opportunities for a witness’ 
identity to be discovered, which may place the witness in 
significant danger. Many suppliers will not have the ability to 
provide their interviewees with witness protection. 
Commissions of Inquiry, including the COI, do not have 
witness protection mechanisms.205 Although the mandate of 
the IIIM establishes that the mechanism will have its own 
witness and victim protection unit, the IIIM head has 
indicated that it will not have a full-fledged protection 
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regime.206 Rather, it will use its leverage to work with states 
to ensure that states provide protection.207   
Repeated interviewing may also have positive and 
negative psychological effects on the individual being 
interviewed. On the one hand, individuals who have suffered 
or witnessed a trauma may find it valuable and potentially 
even therapeutic to recount their stories.208 On the other hand, 
the process of repeatedly recounting a traumatic event may 
be painful for the interviewee.209 How the interview is 
conducted may cause harm, even if the interview is 
conducted respectfully and with thought given to minimizing 
harm. For example, where an interviewer is looking to assess 
credibility, she may ask the same questions in different ways 
or ask questions targeting specific details like times and 
dates.210 The witness may take this to indicate the interviewer 
does not believe him.211 If this same witness is interviewed in 
a similar style multiple times, he may feel angry, frustrated, 
or helpless as a result of his perception that he is not being 
believed.  
 
ii. Principle of voluntary informed consent 
The principle of voluntary informed consent requires 
the investigating actor to ensure that participants are aware 
                                                 
 
 
206 See U.N. Doc A/71/755, supra note 171 at ¶ 39; Marchi-Uhel, supra note 
118.  
207 Marchi-Uhel, supra note 118. 
208 Soraya Seedat, Willem P. Pienaar & David Williams, Ethics of Research 
on Survivors of Trauma, 6 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY REPORTS 262, 262 (2004). 
209 Id. at 262–263. 
210 Boutruche, supra note 201 at 137–138. 
211 Id. at 137–138. 
422 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 26 
of the methods to be used and the goals of the investigation; 
and that they are able to choose the degree and type of 
involvement they have in the investigation.212 For example, 
participants may consent to their information being used in a 
published report, may agree that it can be provided to 
criminal investigators or prosecutors, or may require that the 
information be kept entirely confidential.213 They may also 
request anonymity, or agree to have their identities made 
public.214 In all cases, participants must understand the 
potential consequences of their choices.215 
A problem emerges as new suppliers and, in 
particular, intermediary actors enter the marketplace. 
Suppliers may wish to share the information they have with 
these actors. The IIIM, for instance, has concluded a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the COI.216 Given the 
differences in mandates between the two institutions, 
however, the IIIM requires access to the COI’s materials in 
order to determine precisely which information could be 
useful to it.217 Where the information was gathered before 
December 2016, the IIIM did not exist and so the COI would 
not have been able to obtain consent to share information with 
it. As a result, the COI has to attempt to go back to its sources 
and seek consent.218 Where it is unable to locate the source or 
otherwise obtain consent, it may not share the information 
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with the IIIM.219 Additionally, the IIIM has clearly stated that 
it will not share information if the provider has indicated that 
such information is confidential.220 This creates a tension 
between the principle of voluntary obtained consent and the 
efficacy of IIIM investigations. It also foreshadows the 
difficulties likely to emerge should a hybrid or international 
tribunal with jurisdiction over the Syrian conflict be 
established in the future.   
 
E. ASSESSMENT OF CHALLENGES 
 
The challenges resulting from the increased number of 
suppliers can be attributed to three key features of the 
marketplace. The first is that suppliers are in a relationship of 
competition rather than coordination. Because these actors do 
not necessarily work together, they may duplicate their 
efforts, inefficiently using resources and potentially placing 
witnesses in danger. They may also not want to share 
information with each other, or see no reason to do so. Their 
failures to coordinate also mean that demanders have to 
expend time and money navigating a complex web of 
suppliers in seeking the information they want.  
The second feature is that suppliers themselves 
determine the standards applicable to the work they 
undertake. While some engage in a process of information 
collection and protection that is highly professionalized, 
others lack the time, financial resources, and staff necessary 
to identify and apply techniques that will increase the utility 
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of the information they gather to any future criminal 
proceedings.   
The third characteristic is that the actors in the 
marketplace are not static. When new actors, such as the IIIM, 
enter the market after it has been up and running for some 
time, it creates the need for suppliers to go back to sources 
and obtain updated informed consent. As outlined above, this 
may be impossible. It also requires the expenditure of 
valuable time and resources.  
Recognizing these features allows for the development 
of a targeted regulatory system which may improve the 
overall functioning of the market and the quality of its 
products. 
 
V. REGULATING THE MARKETPLACE 
The introduction of one or more regulatory institutions 
offers an avenue through which the challenges summarized 
above may be, if not entirely surmounted, at least lessened in 
impact. This paper proposes one such regulatory framework, 
namely a model which strengthens the already existing IIIM 
using aspects of the regulatory system for private military 
companies as well as that of the humanitarian cluster 
approach. Such a framework would specifically target the 
shortcomings identified above, and look to improve the 
overall functioning of the marketplace.  
 
A. THE BUILDING BLOCKS 
 
i. The IIIM 
 
The IIIM was discussed in detail in Chapter 2.IV.D 
above; however, some additional information is necessary to 
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illustrate how it specifically addresses several of the 
challenges identified in this marketplace.   
By serving as a “central receptacle for evidence from a 
variety of disparate sources”,221 the IIIM endeavors to “play a 
role in promoting a more comprehensive and integrated 
accountability strategy for the Syrian Arab Republic.”222 The 
mechanism is already looking to work with a wide variety of 
suppliers to compile materials and ultimately create casefiles. 
It met twice with Syrian NGOs in 2017, ultimately 
establishing a platform for biannual meetings going forward 
and creating a protocol governing cooperation between the 
NGOs and the IIIM.223  
The IIIM and CIJA have also established close ties, 
with CIJA providing cooperation and assistance to the 
mechanism that it expects will increase as the IIIM further 
develops its infrastructure.224 The IIIM has been working with 
U.N. bodies including the COI, with which it is seeking to 
establish a cooperation agreement; and the United Nations 
Secretariat, from which it is looking to access information 
previously obtained by the Organisation for the Prohibition 
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of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative 
Mechanism.225  
The IIIM has the potential to move from solely 
cooperation to coordination as well, and is already taking 
certain steps in that direction. It has stated that it will work 
alongside national jurisdictions to determine “areas where it 
can add most value to existing work while avoiding 
duplication”226 and that it is “working on strategies aimed at 
promoting greater coordination with civil society actors to 
enhance the overall effectiveness of the collective work being 
done.”227 In November 2018, the IIIM issued its first 
information bulletin, which included a section entitled “What 
kind of documentation gathered by Syrian NGOs is of 
particular high value for the IIIM?”, providing a measure of 
direction to NGOs looking to collect information to assist with 
future prosecutions.228 
To facilitate the collection and storage of materials, the 
IIIM is currently setting up an IT system which will organize 
the information such that it is searchable; establish metadata 
to improve the ease of analysis of the material; identify 
duplicate information; and ensure confidentiality.229 
 
ii. The regulatory framework for private military 
companies 
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The regulatory framework for private military 
companies (PMCs) is comprised of two key components: the 
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service 
Providers (ICoC),230 and the International Code of Conduct 
for Private Security Service Providers Association (ICoCA).231 
This paper will focus on the ICoC.232 
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The ICoC establishes “a commonly-agreed upon set of 
principles for [PMCs]” as well as “a foundation to translate 
those principles into related standards as well as governance 
and oversight mechanisms.”233 It outlines principles 
regarding the conduct of personnel, including rules on the use 
of force and rules prohibiting torture; as well as principles 
addressing management and governance, including 
commitments concerning personnel selection and training.234 
The text of the ICoC was developed through multi-
stakeholder consultations, using as a foundation the 
Montreux Document235 and the “protect, respect, remedy” 
framework outlined by the UN Secretary General’s Special 
Representative on Business and Human Rights.236 
The ICoC is voluntary, which raises the danger that 
PMCs simply will not comply with the standards 
articulated.237 Consequently, some form of incentive is 
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required for compliance.238 One such incentive comes from 
what Anne-Marie Buzatu terms as “co-regulatory 
approaches” undertaken by national governments and 
international institutions.239 These demand actors have taken 
steps, under national law or in outlining procurement 
policies, to make it obligatory for a PMC to be compliant with 
the ICoC and be a member of the ICoCA before the actor will 
contract with the PMC.240 In doing so, the demand actors give 
the voluntary framework some teeth, incentivizing suppliers 
to join and to comply.241 
 
iii. The humanitarian cluster approach 
 
At its core, the humanitarian cluster approach looks to 
ensure groups of actors working within the same context 
towards the same goal coordinate in their operations so as to 
act more effectively overall. It also provides a framework 
through which key actors can engage and promulgate 
standards and best practices.  
In order to understand the workings of the cluster 
approach, it is necessary to get a sense of its key components. 
These are summarized by J. Benton Heath as follows: 
The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA), an office of the UN Secretariat, manages the 
coordination of humanitarian affairs, overseeing 
humanitarian operations as well as the coordination of 
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humanitarian policy and advocacy. Policy setting and best 
practices are developed by the [Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee (IASC)], which includes all the UN operational 
agencies, such as the High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and the World Health Organization (WHO), and 
which extends standing invitations to a range of 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the Red Cross, and 
the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Country-
level efforts are overseen by an in-country humanitarian 
coordinator, who is named by the head of OCHA and remains 
directly accountable to her. The head of OCHA is an 
appointee of the UN secretary-general.242 
Global cluster leads are responsible for putting 
together clusters of organizations which articulate and 
disseminate standards and best practices, as well as provide 
training and operational support.243 At the country level, the 
humanitarian coordinator designates clusters of 
organizations and leaders to act within the country as 
needed.244 Cluster leaders within the country then focus on 
ensuring actors within their particular sector provide 
humanitarian responses in a manner that is coordinated and 
effective.245 
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B. THE HYBRID MODEL 
 
None of the above models on their own are sufficient 
to ameliorate all three of the primary challenges to the 
marketplace identified above. As a result, this paper proposes 
a hybrid model combining elements of all three frameworks, 
with an overall structure similar to that of the humanitarian 
cluster approach.  
As a preliminary point, it should be noted that this 
hybrid model could be situated within the U.N. framework, 
as are the IIIM as well as the cluster approach, or take the form 
of a multi-stakeholder initiative, similar to the regulatory 
framework for PMCs. This paper does not comment on the 
merits or shortcomings of one approach as opposed to the 
other, but rather looks to outline what the model itself would 
look like and how it would address the particular challenges 
facing the marketplace for the investigation of atrocities. In 
order to do so, it examines the two key components of the 
hybrid model: one permanent body, the “Office of 
Coordination and Standard-Setting” (OCSS); and temporary 
bodies, known as “Situation-Specific Mechanisms”, 
established by the OCSS as needed.  
 
i. The Office of Coordination and Standard-Setting 
 
At the top of the institutional structure of the hybrid 
model would be an institution similar to the OCHA, which 
this paper will refer to as the “Office of Coordination and 
Standard-Setting” (OCSS). The OCSS would be a permanent 
body which, as its name suggests, would have two primary 
functions: coordination and standard-setting.  
Turning first to coordination, the OCSS would look to 
monitor and assess ongoing conflict situations to determine 
432 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 26 
whether it would be necessary to establish SSMs to improve 
the overall functioning of the marketplace. Considerations in 
this decision-making process would need to be laid out, but 
could include length of the conflict, ability of investigative 
authorities to access the territory and conduct investigations, 
volume of information being produced, and number of actors 
active in the situation.  
In making these determinations, the OCSS would 
maintain strong working relationships with actors both 
supplying and demanding information concerning human 
rights abuses and international crimes. This would require it 
to have the personnel and technical capacity necessary to 
liaise with these actors and monitor conflict situations, but 
allow it to be a leaner organization than the IIIM, for example, 
as it would not require the same degree of staff, IT resources, 
and storage facilities. As a permanent body, however, the 
OCSS would have on-going relationships with supply and 
demand actors, retain the institutional memory necessary to 
set up situation-specific mechanisms, and provide at least one 
static actor in the marketplace to whom individual victims 
and witnesses could provide their informed consent.  
Shifting focus to standard-setting, the OCSS would 
look to articulate market standards for investigative practices, 
providing a central location to which supply actors could turn 
in order to locate best practices. As mentioned above, 
documents outlining standards and best practices for human 
rights work and investigative methods do exist. These could 
provide a starting point for the type of multi-stakeholder 
process that led to the creation of the ICoC, but one geared 
towards articulating standards for investigating atrocity 
crimes. Both supply and demand actors could be involved in 
the process, so as to ensure that standards reflected both the 
capacities of suppliers as well as the needs of demanders. 
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Although an SSM such as the IIIM could in theory serve the 
same purpose,246 allocating management of standards-setting 
to a separate permanent body allows for a greater degree of 
specialization and promotes the development of permanent 
institutional memory. 
As is the case with the PMC model, the crucial issue 
would be how to incentivize suppliers to adopt and 
implement standards. Demand actors may be positioned to 
provide the necessary incentives. For example, they may 
indicate that they will, at least for the most part, only accept 
information from those suppliers who meet the standards. 
This may happen as a result of a deliberate choice to 
encourage the adoption of the standards. Or it may occur 
more naturally if suppliers using the best practices 
consistently produce credible and reliable information, or if a 
court provides a favorable evidentiary ruling taking into 
account the supplier’s application of recognized standards. 
An additional challenge to articulating best practices 
would relate to the nature of the standards to be articulated 
and applied. There are different standards for admissibility of 
evidence based on where a given prosecution is taking place. 
National jurisdictions have different rules of evidence from 
each other, and from international fora. In the Syrian context, 
it is possible that cases may be heard at an international or 
hybrid tribunal which does not yet exist. Consequently, its 
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rules on admissibility do not yet exist, although it may be 
possible to draw on the rules of existing bodies for guidance. 
This is where multi-stakeholderism has a significant role to 
play – engaging demand actors from a variety of jurisdictions 
and with varied needs would help to ensure that the 
standards ultimately developed are sensitive to different 
contexts.   
 
ii. Situation-Specific Mechanisms 
 
Should the OCSS determine it is necessary, it would 
then establish an SSM similar in nature to the IIIM. One of the 
key strengths of the IIIM framework is its ability to facilitate 
interactions between supply and demand actors.247 Provided 
that the SSM is able to cooperate with the wide variety of 
supply actors active in a given context, the benefits to actors 
on the demand side, in particular national prosecutors, would 
be readily apparent. Most importantly, demand actors would 
be able to liaise primarily with one sole actor as opposed to 
many. As regards documentary or electronic materials, this 
would limit the amount of time required to acquire the 
necessary information, and also address the concern that 
                                                 
 
 
247 It is important to keep in mind, however, that there may be issues 
associated with national prosecutors’ use of or reliance on evidence 
collected by outside sources. Kaleck and Kroker, supra note 153, raise the 
concern of how much of the investigative stage of prosecutions, 
particularly in inquisitorial systems, can be left to or helped by the IIIM. 
Additionally, Hohler and Pederson, supra note 100, note that it is unlikely 
any prosecutor ethically could rely on an intermediary actor such as the 
IIIM’s analysis without conducting his/her own due diligence and 
review. These limitations are important to bear in mind when assessing 
the potential impact of the IIIM on national prosecutions.  
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demand actors might simply have no access to or no 
institutional relationships with certain suppliers.  
Another key benefit of adopting the IIIM framework is 
its potential to more effectively sort through and categorize 
information and materials received, while ensuring that it is 
stored in adherence with criminal law standards. By 
effectively using IT tools, the SSM could improve how 
information is received, searched, transferred, and 
managed.248 It would also allow those actors with fewer 
resources, but which still wished to contribute to the end goal 
of criminal accountability, to provide useful information 
without needing to establish expensive and extensive IT 
systems. Moreover, linking each individual SSM to a 
permanent body also would avoid the need to reinvent the 
wheel with each new conflict situation. Instead, existing IT 
systems could be improved and, as necessary, adapted to new 
situations.  
The SSM need not be limited, however, to coordinating 
between the demand and supply side. It could also take on a 
role similar to that of the humanitarian coordinator at the 
country level in the cluster approach.249 In addition to being a 
repository for information, the SSM could work alongside the 
various actors to improve overall coordination, perhaps 
encouraging the formation of clusters based on region, types 
of offences investigated, types of information produced, or 
some combination thereof. Those clusters could then look to 
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coordinate amongst themselves to avoid overlap and 
promote the effective use of resources. This would, ideally, 
provide a form of overhead assistance and coordination 
without sacrificing the knowledge and experience of actors 
involved in day-to-day investigations. 
As a conflict situation ends and investigations and 
prosecutions come to a close, the SSM could then scale back 
its operations, eventually winding down entirely. Thought 
could be given as to the ability of the OCSS to serve as an 
archive system for the information obtained, or whether a 
separate archive would need to be established.   
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The hybrid model outlined above provides an initial 
flavor for how the marketplace for investigating atrocities 
could be regulated in order to improve the quality of the 
product produced, as well as the efficiency and ethics of 
interactions between its participants, and between these 
participants and their sources. Alternative models could be 
imagined, and may be better-suited to the features of this 
particular marketplace. Regardless of what course is adopted, 
the reality appears to be that multiple suppliers will continue 
to play an active and important role in creating and gathering 
information concerning human rights violations and 
international crimes. Strengthening these actors’ abilities to 
do so is crucial to increasing the opportunities for justice 
available to victims of atrocities. 
  
 
 
